This book offers a comprehensive and accessible introduction to game theory, emphasizing both noncooperative and cooperative aspects of strategic decision-making. In the chapters on noncooperative game theory, you will explore advanced topics such as perfect equilibrium, evolutionary stable strategies, and correlated equilibrium, along with a range of subjects often underrepresented in other textbooks.

The cooperative game theory sections cover essential topics like coalitional games, cake-cutting and fairness, cooperative bargaining, and matching theory. Additionally, the book includes an insightful chapter on mechanism design.

Designed for use in one-semester advanced undergraduate or graduate-level courses, this textbook stands apart from others at the same level. Each chapter begins with clear theoretical definitions, followed by carefully detailed examples. Select chapters include propositions that either demonstrate the existence of equilibrium in abstract games or interrelate various game-theoretic concepts.

While rigorous in its scope, the book assumes no advanced background in calculus or algebra. The mathematical exposition is kept as straightforward and self-contained as possible, ensuring that readers can easily apply theoretical ideas to practical examples and follow proofs with ease.

Table of Contents

Part I Static Noncooperative Games with Complete Information

1 Introduction to Strategic Form Games

2 Dominance

3 Rationalizability

4 Nash Equilibrium

5 Perfect Equilibrium

6 Evolutionary Stable Strategies

7 Correlated Equilibrium

Part II Static Noncooperative Games with Incomplete Information

8 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium

Part III Dynamic Noncooperative Games with Perfect or Imperfect Information

9 Introduction to Extensive Form Games

10 Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium

11 Sequential Equilibrium

12 Repeated Games

Part IV lmplementation Theory

13 Implementation of Social Choice Rules

Part V Cooperative Games

14 Coalitional Games with Transferable Utility

15 Cake Cutting and Fairness

16 Cooperative Bargaining

17 Matching Markets

About the Author

Ismail Saglam earned his BSc in Electrical Engineering and his MA and PhD in Economics from Bilkent University. He is currently a Professor of Economics at TOBB University of Economics and Technology (TOBB ETU) in Ankara, Turkey. His research spans a broad range of topics, including applied game theory, axiomatic bargaining, matching theory, mechanism design, monetary general equilibrium, oligopoly, and regulation.