Joseph E. Harrington, Jr.

#Games
#Strategies
#Economics
#Business
Written for majors courses in economics, business, political science, and international relations, but accessible to students across the undergraduate spectrum, Joseph Harrington's innovative textbook makes the tools and applications of game theory and strategic reasoning both fascinating and easy to understand. Each chapter focuses a specific strategic situation as a way of introducing core concepts informally at first, then more fully, with a minimum of mathematics. At the heart of the book is a diverse collection of strategic scenarios, not only from business and politics, but from history, fiction, sports, and everyday life as well. With this approach, students don't just learn clever answers to puzzles, but instead acquire genuine insights into human behavior.
Table of Contents
PART 1 Constructing a Game Using the Extensive and Strategic Forms
CHAPTER 1 Introduction to Strategic Reasoning
CHAPTER 2 Building a Model of a Strategic Situation
PART 2 Rational Behavior
CHAPTER 3 Eliminating the Impossible: Solving a Game when Rationality Is Common Knowledge
CHAPTER 4 Stable Play: Nash Equilibria in Discrete Games with Two or Three Players
CHAPTER 5 Stable Play: Nash Equilibria in Discrete n-Player Games
CHAPTER 6 Stable Play: Nash Equilibria in Continuous Games
CHAPTER 7 Keep 'Em Guessing: Randomized Strategies
PART 3 Extensive Form Games
CHAPTER 8 Taking Turns: Sequential Games with Perfect Information
CHAPTER 9 Taking Turns in the Dark: Sequential Games with Imperfect Information
PART 4 Games of Incomplete Information
CHAPTER 10 I Know Something You Don't Know: Games with Private Information
CHAPTER 11 What You Do Tells Me Who You Are: Signaling Games
CHAPTER 12 Lies and the Lying Liars That Tell Them: Cheap-Talk Games
PART 5 Repeated Games
CHAPTER 13 Playing Forever: Repeated Interaction with Infinitely Lived Players
CHAPTER 14 Cooperation and Reputation: Applications of Repeated Interaction with Infinitely Lived Players
CHAPTER 15 Interaction in Infinitely Lived Institutions
PART 6 Evolutionary Game Theory
CHAPTER 16 Evolutionary Game Theory and Biology: Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
CHAPTER 17 Evolutionary Game Theory and Biology: Replicator Dynamics
Answers to Check Your Understanding
Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. is Professor of Economics at Johns Hopkins University. He has served on numerous editorial boards, including the RAND Journal of Economics, Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics, and the Southern Economic Journal. His research has appeared in top journals in a variety of disciplines including economics (e.g., the American Economic Review, Journal of Political Economy, and Games and Economic Behavior), political science (Economics and Politics, Public Choice), sociology (American Journal of Sociology), organizational behavior (Management Science), and psychology (Journal of Mathematical Psychology). He is a co-author of the leading textbook Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, which is currently in its fourth edition.









